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The economic recovery is allowing monetary policy normalisation 
to be initiated in some of the main advanced economies after 
nearly 10 years of monetary stimulus. This applies particularly to 
the United States. In December 2015 the Federal Reserve 
commenced, with a 0.25 pp increment, a gradual process of 
official interest rate rises, with another increase in 2016 and three 
more in 2017, initiating the process of balance sheet reduction in 
October of that same year. Other central banks have not made so 
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much progress in withdrawing monetary stimuli, although the 
Bank of England raised its reference rate in November, and even 
the ECB and, to a lesser extent, the Bank of Japan are already 
beginning to define their exit strategy. In particular, the Federal 
Reserve faces major dilemmas in this process, since the output 
gap of the US economy is positive and the degree of slack in its 
labour market is very small, but the prevailing rate of inflation 
continues to be very moderate. Furthermore, should there be a 
greater‑than‑expected tightening of monetary policy stance, some 
markets could be exposed to a significant correction, as evidenced 
by the turmoil in February 2018.
To this should be added a fiscal policy which has adopted a 
markedly expansionary slant in recent months with the approval of 
a fiscal reform in late December and a bipartisan agreement in early 
February which raises the expenditure ceiling by $296 billion in 
fiscal years 2018 and 2019.1 The tax reform includes most notably 
a corporate income tax cut from 35% to 21% and the immediate 
deduction of 100% of expenses arising from investment — which 
will be temporary — as well as other measures affecting taxation of 
multinationals’ profits generated abroad. The reform also introduces 
changes to the direct taxation of households which will reduce their 
tax burden at all income levels between 2018 and 2025.
In principle, the procyclicality of these tax measures may contribute 
to an overheating of the economy, leading to inflation above the 
central bank target which may eventually require interest rates to 
be raised more rapidly than anticipated. To illustrate this, the 
results of a NiGEM model simulation of the effect of expansionary 
fiscal policy (with and without a monetary policy response) are 
analysed below for the USA and other economies.
In the first simulated scenario, monetary policy does not respond 
to the effects of the fiscal stimulus, so that the interest rate follows 
the course currently expected by the Federal Reserve. The impact 
of the fiscal expansion on the level of GDP exceeds 1.5 pp in the 
period 2018‑2021 and drops to 0.5 pp towards the end of the 
forecasting horizon, between 2023 and 2027 (see Chart 1). Inflation 
increases more than expected under the baseline scenario 
between the years 2018‑2022 (see Chart 2). Additionally, it is 
important to take into account that the expansionary measures will 
contribute to raising the path of the government deficit by nearly 1 
pp of GDP in the next decade, which is all the more significant in a 
situation of high government debt (see Chart 3). According to the 
model, aggregate demand and, consequently, imports would 
increase more rapidly than exports, which would worsen the 
external deficit by 0.4 pp as a percentage of GDP with respect to 
the scenario without fiscal stimulus.
Under the second scenario, monetary policy is allowed to respond 
to the effect that the fiscal stimulus has on the output gap and 
inflation. And under the third scenario, in addition to this 
endogenous response of monetary policy, it is assumed that the 
term premium increases by 75 bp, thus returning to its average 
historical level. Under these two scenarios, short‑term interest 
rates increase above the trend currently expected by the Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) to a lesser extent than in the 
aforementioned case, since the increase in the term premium 
implies that financial conditions tighten. This response of monetary 
policy causes both GDP and inflation to increase to a lesser extent 
than under the initial scenario (see Charts 4 and 5). 
Regarding the effects on other areas, under the exogenous 
monetary policy scenario, the GDP of China, Japan and the United 
Kingdom would rise by around 0.5 pp at end‑2019 with respect to 
the baseline scenario due to higher demand for their exports by the 
United States (see Chart 6). In the euro area, the impact would be 
somewhat less (0.35 pp). Under a scenario with a monetary policy 
response, the effects would be lower, between 0.1 pp and 0.2 pp in 
China, the euro area and Japan, and would even be negative in the 
United Kingdom (‑0.1 pp with respect to the baseline scenario). 
Furthermore, the US term premium may spread to the other 
countries in view of this economy’s central position in the global 
financial markets, with the attendant contractionary effects on the 
GDP of the rest of the world. In some countries, this financial 
channel may outweigh the commercial channel referred to above.
In short, the fiscal expansion will foreseeably contribute to greater 
dynamism of the US economy in the short term, even if the Federal 
Reserve responds by stepping up the pace of monetary policy 
normalisation against a background marked by a positive output 
gap and growing inflation. However, this baseline scenario of 
higher short‑term growth in activity is accompanied, in a medium‑
term horizon, by an increase in the risks associated with worsening 
public finances and with a widening current‑account deficit. The 
international impact of this fiscal expansion will foreseeably be 
modest and even negative if there is a contagion effect in the 
financial markets of other countries, particularly if the US 
authorities decide to introduce protection measures to counteract 
the worsening US external balance.
the chAnge in mAcroeconomic policy stAnce in the united stAtes (cont’d)
1  In addition, in February President Trump unveiled an infrastructure 
improvement plan for $200 billion in 10 years, which could foreseeably 
generate total investment of at least $1.5 billion by fostering the 
investment of state and local governments and of private firms. However, 
this plan is currently at the initial discussion stage and its approval is 
expected to be complicated.
